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Abstract 
In June 2010, the Japanese cabinet adopted a new Basic Energy Plan (BEP). This was the third 
such plan that the government has approved since the passage of the Basic Act on Energy Policy in 
2002, and it represents the most significant statement of Japanese energy policy in more than four 
years, since the publication of the New National Energy Strategy (NNES) in 2006.  Perhaps more 
than its predecessors, moreover, the new plan establishes a number of ambitious targets as well as 
more detailed measures for achieving those targets. Among the targets are a doubling of Japan’s 
“energy independence ratio,” a doubling of the percentage of electricity generated by renewable 
sources and nuclear power, and a 30 percent reduction in energy-related CO2 emissions, all by 
2030.  This paper explains the origins of the 2010 BEP and why it was adopted.  It then describes 
the content of the plan and how it differs from the NNES. A third section analyzes the 
appropriateness of the new goals and targets contained in the BEP and their feasibility, finding that 
achievement of many of the targets was likely to be quite challenging even before the March 2011 
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
In June 2010, the Japanese cabinet adopted a new Basic Energy Plan (BEP). This was the 
third such plan that the government has approved since the passage of the Basic Act on Energy 
Policy in 2002, and it represents the most significant statement of Japanese energy policy in more 
than four years, since the publication of the New National Energy Strategy (NNES) in 2006.1  
Perhaps more than its predecessors, moreover, the new plan establishes a number of ambitious 
targets as well as more detailed measures for achieving those targets. Among the targets are a 
doubling of Japan’s “energy independence ratio,” a doubling of the percentage of electricity 
generated by renewable sources and nuclear power, and a 30 percent reduction in energy-related 
CO2 emissions, all by 2030. 
This paper explains the origins of the 2010 BEP and why it was adopted.  It then describes 
the content of the plan and how it differs from the NNES. A third section analyzes the 
appropriateness of the new goals and targets contained in the BEP and their feasibility.  It finds that 
achievement of many of the targets is likely to be quite challenging, all the more so in the aftermath 
of the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. 
 
2. Background 
For most of the postwar era, Japan lacked an overarching energy plan or strategy.  
Beginning in 1967, the government published every two to five years a Long-Term Energy Supply 
and Demand Outlook (Choki enerugii jukyu mitoshi), which forecast such important indices as 
energy demand by sector, primary energy supply by fuel, and, in more recent years, energy-derived 
CO2 emissions based on different sets of assumptions about the policies likely to be in place (IEA 
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2003, 20; IEA 2008, 21).  But the Outlook itself did not contain or determine policy.  Instead, 
Japanese energy policy consisted of a patchwork of laws, regulations, and programs.  Many of 
these measures were adopted in response to the oil shocks of the 1970s, while another round of 
measures was passed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, largely in response to growing concerns 
about climate change.  
In 2002, however, the Japanese government created a more systematic and comprehensive 
energy policy planning structure.  In June of that year, the Diet adopted a “Fundamental Law on 
Energy Policy Measures” (Enerugii seisaku kihon ho), also known as the Basic Act on Energy 
Policy (Law No. 71), which set “the general guiding direction for Japan’s future energy policy” 
(IEA 2008, 29). 
The origins of the Basic Act were unusual.  In Japan, the vast majority of laws originate in 
the cabinet.2  Typically, less than 15 percent of bills enacted into law are proposed by members of 
the Diet, Japan’s bicameral legislative body.3  The Basic Act on Energy Policy, however, resulted 
from a bill that was sponsored by a group of legislators.  In this case, 54 members of the Diet, 
representing both houses and three different political parties, collaborated in drafting the original 
bill.  Led by Tokio Kano, an upper house member affiliated with the then ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party and a former electric power company executive, the group first submitted the bill 
to the lower house, where deliberations took place from May 17 to 28, 2002.4  After securing lower 
house passage, the bill was sent to the upper house on June 4, and, four days later, that body also 
approved what came to be known as Japan’s “energy constitution” (enerugii kenpo).  The Basic 
Act on Energy Policy was promptly adopted by the cabinet of then Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi and became law on July 14, 2002. 
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 The Basic Act begins with a short statement of purpose: 
Energy is essential to the maintenance and development of the national economy and 
enhancing the stability of peoples’ lives.  Moreover, inasmuch as energy has a major impact 
on the local and global environments, it is necessary to promote measures concerning 
supply and demand and to clarify the responsibilities of national and local governments.  
Establishing measures to ensure long-term, comprehensive, and planned policies for that 
supply and demand will contribute to the development of the national and world 
economies, while contributing to the preservation of the national and global environment 
(Basic Act on Energy Policy, 14 June 2002, Law No. 71; translation by the authors).   
The Basic Act then establishes three general goals of energy policy: securing a stable supply of 
energy, ensuring environmental sustainability, and utilizing market mechanisms (see also IEA 
2008, 29).  The act also defines the roles and obligations of all the key actors and stakeholders: the 
central government, local governments, businesses, and the general public. 
The Basic Act provides no specifics about energy policy, however.  Instead, for that 
purpose, it requires the government to formulate a basic plan to promote energy supply and 
demand measures on a long-term, comprehensive, and systematic basis.  The government is 
supposed to review the basic energy plan at least every three years and revise it as necessary in light 
of changing circumstances and the effectiveness of existing policies.  The Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry (METI) was tasked with formulating the draft basic energy plan and then 
seeking cabinet approval before reporting it to the Diet.5 
The first Basic Energy Plan (Enerugi kihon keikaku or BEP) was duly developed and 
adopted in October 2003.  According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), its key points were 
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to promote nuclear power generation, to enhance efforts to secure a stable oil supply, and to lead 
the formulation of an effective international framework for enhancing energy conservation and 
coping with climate change (IEA 2008, 29).  A revision of the BEP was prepared in late 2006 and 
adopted by the cabinet in early 2007, but it was based on and largely overshadowed by another 
energy policy statement, the New National Energy Strategy (Shin-kokka enerugii senryaku or 
NNES), which was issued by METI in May 2006 (IEA 2008, 59). 
In contrast to the BEP, the NNES did not receive broader government approval, but it 
figured prominently in subsequent energy policy discussions.  The NNES was developed in 
response to renewed concerns about Japan’s energy security due, in particular, to rising oil prices, a 
revival of resource nationalism among foreign energy suppliers, and growing regional competition 
and conflict over energy resources (ESSG 2006; Christoffels 2007).  Thus, in contrast to the Basic 
Act, the NNES placed primary emphasis on and sought to bring greater attention to the  issue of 
energy security.  To promote Japan’s energy security, the NNES established ambitious numerical 
targets to be attained by 2030 (see below), and it went on to elaborate eight specific programs 
across a wide range of actions for implementing the strategy (METI 2006a, 14). 
During the following years, however, more of a balance was restored in Japanese energy 
policy.  Concerns about security of supply abated somewhat, despite a continued rise in oil prices, 
while concerns about environmental sustainability, especially climate change, returned to the fore.  
In May 2007, then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced an initiative, “Cool Earth 50,” to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in Japan and globally in the short-, medium-, and long-term.6  In July 
2008, the cabinet adopted a detailed “Action Plan for Achieving a Low-carbon Society.”7  And 
shortly after taking power in September 2009, the new government led by the Democratic Party of 
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Japan announced an ambitious goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 25 percent below the 
1990 level by 2020 and then prepared a detailed bill on “Global Warming Countermeasures” that it 
submitted to the Diet the following March.8 
At the same time, government officials began to fret about the international 
competitiveness of the Japanese energy industry.  For example, Japan’s solar cell industry, which 
had been the largest in the world, was surpassed in 2008 by those of Germany and China.9  Then, in 
late 2009, a Japanese nuclear power plant manufacturer was outbid for a contract to build four 
nuclear reactors in the UAE by a Korean-consortium that had never held an international 
contract.10 
 
3. The New Basic Energy Plan 
This was the context in which the new Basic Energy Plan was developed in 2010.11  Under 
the terms of the Basic Act, the revised Basic Energy Plan adopted in 2007 was scheduled for 
review.  Accordingly, METI  began developing a revision of the BEP in February 2010 and 
presented a draft outline to the Basic Energy Planning Committee, a subcommittee of METI’s 
Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy (ACNRE), on March 24.  At the same 
time, METI posted the draft outline on its website and solicited public comments.12  On April 19, 
METI proposed a draft of the revised BEP at the Basic Energy Planning Committee (IEEJ 2010a, 
1).  A final round of deliberations was held in the subcommittee on June 8, and after minor 
changes, the final, 66-page plan was approved by the cabinet of then Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama and released to the public on June 18 (IEEJ 2010b, 7).13 
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3.1. Overall Goals and Targets for 2030 
The BEP lays out seven general goals (or what it calls “basic viewpoints”) of Japanese 
energy policy: 
o Enhancing overall energy security; 
o Strengthening policy to counter global warming; 
o Achieving economic growth, with energy as a core driver; 
o Ensuring the safety of the energy supply; 
o Ensuring the efficient functioning of energy markets;  
o Restructuring the energy industry; and  
o Gaining public understanding. 
To achieve these goals, the BEP establishes five ambitious targets for 2030.  The first target 
is to double Japan’s “energy self-sufficiency ratio” (currently 18 percent) to about 40 percent and 
its “self-developed fossil fuel supply ratio” (currently 26 percent) to about 50 percent, and, as a 
result, to raise its “energy independence ratio” (currently 38 percent) to about 70 percent.  The 
latter figure is currently the average among the members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
The energy self-sufficiency (ESF) ratio is the percentage of Japan’s primary energy supply 
that is produced domestically and consists primarily of renewable energy sources and nuclear 
power, since Japan produces only very small amounts of coal, natural gas, crude oil, and liquified 
petroleum gases (LPG).  The self-developed fossil fuel supply (SFFS) ratio is the percentage of 
imported coal, natural gas, oil, and LPG that is produced by Japanese companies.  The energy 
independence (EI) ratio is the percentage of Japan’s primary energy supply that consists of either 
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energy produced domestically or imported fossil fuels that are produced by Japanese companies.  It 
can be calculated approximately as follows: 
 
EI = ESF + SFFS * (100% - ESF) 
 
To achieve this target, Japan would bring about a substantial change in its energy mix.  The 
shares attributable to renewable energy sources and nuclear power would more than double.  
Renewables would increase from six percent (in 2007) to 13 percent while nuclear power would 
increase from 10 percent to 24 percent.  Meanwhile, the shares of most fossil fuels would decrease.  
Natural gas would decline from 18 to 16 percent, coal from 22 to 17 percent, and petroleum from 
41 to 28 percent.  Only LPG’s small share of three percent would remain constant. 
In absolute terms, Japan’s primary energy supply would decline by 13 percent, from 592 
million kiloliters (mkL) of oil equivalent to 514 mkL.  The amount of natural gas, coal, and 
petroleum consumed would decline by 24 percent, 35 percent, and 42 percent, respectively.  In 
contrast, consumption of renewable and nuclear energy would increase by 91 percent and 103 
percent, respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Balance of Primary Energy Supply (in millions of kiloliters of oil equivalent) 
 
Source: METI 2010 
 
 
 
The second and related target is to raise the “zero-emission power supply ratio” from the 
current 34 percent to 70 percent.  The zero-emission power supply ratio concerns the percentage of 
electric power that is generated by sources that produce little or no CO2.  To achieve this goal, 
Japan will have to increase substantially the amount of electricity provided by nuclear power and 
renewable sources, especially “new” sources such as wind, solar, and biomass, because the 
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country’s hydroelectric potential has already been largely exploited (IEA 2008, 122).   According 
to the BEP, the shares attributable to renewable and nuclear power will more than double.  For 
renewables, this will mean going from eight percent to 19 percent of electricity generated.  For 
nuclear, from 26 percent to more than 50 percent. 
In turn, Japan will have to increase substantially its renewable energy and nuclear power 
generating capacity.  Installed renewable energy capacity would have to rise from 50 gigawatts 
(GW) to 117.5 GW, an increase of more than 130 percent, and most of this increase would have to 
come from new sources other than hydropower, which has traditionally been the largest source of 
renewable electricity and currently provides most of the renewable generating capacity (IEA 2008, 
150; EDMC 2010, 187 and 207).  Installed nuclear capacity would have to increase from 49.5 GW 
to 67.8 GW.  This increase would be achieved by building 9 more nuclear power plants by 2020 
and more than 14 by 2030.  In addition, Japan would increase the overall operating capacity of the 
nuclear sector, which has been as low as 60 percent in recent years, to about 85 percent by 2020 and 
about 90 percent by 2030. 
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Figure 2 
Electric Power Generation Capacity (in units of 10 Megawatts) 
 
Source: METI 2010 
 
The remaining three targets can be stated much more briefly.  One is to halve the CO2 
emissions of the residential sector.  Another is to maintain and enhance the energy efficiency of the 
industrial sector.  The final target is to maintain or obtain “top-class” shares of global markets for 
energy-related products and systems. 
If these targets are reached, Japan would achieve a significant 30 percent reduction in its 
13 
 
domestic energy-related CO2 emissions, in comparison with 1990s levels, the baseline for the 
Kyoto Protocol.  Since energy-related CO2 emissions actually grew by 15 percent between 1990s 
and 2007, such a cut would represent a 40 percent decline over 2007 levels.  It would also account 
for approximately half of the reductions to be achieved by 2050, or 80 percent below the 1990 
level.14 
 
3.2. Specific Energy Policy Measures 
The bulk of the BEP identifies and proposes a number of specific measures for achieving 
these targets.  The majority (about two-thirds) of the measures fall into three broad categories.  The 
first concerns measures to secure energy resources and to enhance the stability of supply. These 
include 
o strengthening bilateral relations with resource-rich countries through high-level resource 
diplomacy; 
o increasing financial support (so-called “risk money”) for Japanese companies seeking to 
acquire upstream energy concessions; and 
o enhancing the development of non-traditional domestic and overseas energy resources. 
The second category consists of measures to create an independent and 
environmentally-friendly energy supply structure.  This category includes measures to expand the 
introduction of renewable energy sources, to promote nuclear power generation, and to achieve 
advanced utilization of fossil fuels, especially coal. 
 To increase the use of renewable energy, the government would expand the recently 
introduced feed-in tariff system, which currently applies only to small-scale electricity generation 
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by photovoltaic (PV) cells, to include wind, geothermal, biomass, and small- to medium-scale 
hydroelectric plants.  The government would increase its support for the introduction of new 
renewable technologies, through such means as tax reductions, subsidies, and support for research 
and development.  And it would take steps to deregulate the domestic energy market and prepare 
the power grid for intermittent sources of supply.  Other measures that were considered by METI 
include introducing sustainability standards for biofuels and expanding the introduction of 
renewable thermal energy.15 
 To promote nuclear power generation, the government would seek to extend the time 
between routine power plant inspections and to shorten shutdowns during inspections.16  It would 
improve the “power source location” subsidy system, which it uses to gain acceptance by local 
authorities and communities for nuclear power facilities.  And it would take steps toward the 
establishment of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including the development of “pluthermal” 
light-water reactors, which can use plutonium fuel, and fast breeder reactors. 
 Regarding the final set of supply-related measures, the BEP recognizes that Japan will still 
have to rely to a substantial extent on coal, which produces the most CO2 per unit of energy.  But 
the government would take several steps to reduce CO2 emissions from coal.  It would promote the 
commercialization of new, more efficient coal burning technologies, such as integrated 
gasification combined cycle (IGCC), and require that all new coal plants achieve emissions levels 
comparable to IGCC.  It would also accelerate the development and commercialization of 
technology for carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies and require that new coal plants be 
CCS-ready and then be equipped with CCS technology as soon as it became available. 
The third category consists of measures for “realizing a low carbon energy demand 
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structure.”  These are divided into the traditional energy-consuming sectors – industrial, 
transportation, residential, and commercial – as well as cross-sectoral efforts. 
To reduce carbon emissions in the industrial sector, the government would promote the 
substitution of natural gas for coal and petroleum.  It would enforce more stringently the Energy 
Conservation Law (Sho enerugii ho).  And, although Japanese industry already leads the world in 
energy efficiency, the government would promote the maximum introduction of state of the art 
technologies for increasing energy efficiency yet further (see also IEEJ 2010a, 3).  Assuming no 
increase in steel production, which is a major source of Japanese CO2 emissions, the BEP 
anticipates that the industrial sector could achieve a 25 percent reduction in CO2 emissions by 
2030. 
To reduce CO2 emissions in the transportation sector, the government would mobilize all 
possible policy measures to increase the share of new vehicles sales held by next-generation low 
emission vehicles, such as hybrids, electric vehicles, and vehicles that run on fuel cells, from the 
current 10 percent to up to 50 percent by 2020 and up to 70 percent by 2030.  It would seek to 
expand the use of biofuels to around three percent of gasoline consumption by 2020 and higher 
thereafter (IEEJ 2010a, 2).  And it would seek to increase the share of mid- and long-distance 
transportation held by rail and coastal shipping from the current 55 percent to 80 percent by 2030 
(IEEJ 2010a, 3).  Assuming no increase in the number of miles driven, the BEP estimates that the 
transportation sector could achieve a 38 percent reduction in CO2 emissions by 2030. 
 The greatest potential for reductions in CO2 emissions on a percentage basis, however, lies 
in the residential and commercial sectors, which saw large increases in emissions of 42 percent and 
48 percent, respectively, between 1990 and 2007 (METI 2010; see also EMDC 2010, 47).  To 
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reduce CO2 emissions in these sectors, the government would promote the development of 
net-zero-energy houses and buildings by 2020 and make them the norm for new construction by 
2030.  It would set compulsory energy-savings standards.  It would promote the widespread use of 
highly efficient water heaters (80 to 90 percent of all houses by 2030) and the replacement of all 
lights with high-efficiency lighting.  And it would enhance financial support and regulatory 
measures to diffuse energy-saving equipment and products.  Assuming only modest increases in 
the number of households and commercial floor space, the BEP calculates that the residential and 
commercial sectors could achieve reductions in CO2 emissions by 2030 of 52 percent and 57 
percent, respectively. 
 Other specific measures contained in the BEP concern building next-generation energy and 
social systems, expanding the use of innovative energy technologies, promoting international 
energy and environmental cooperation, reforming the structure of the energy industry, and 
promoting public understanding and human resource training.  They include achieving the smart 
grid and smart communities, promoting the development and installation of smart meters and other 
energy management systems, diffusing fuel cells and developing a hydrogen supply infrastructure, 
and accelerating the development and dissemination of innovative energy technologies. 
 
4. Analysis 
The adoption of a new BEP raises at least several questions.  How has Japanese energy 
policy changed?  How appropriate are the new targets?  What challenges do they face, and how 
likely is it that the new targets will be realized? 
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4.1. Changes in the Goals and Targets of Japanese Energy Policy 
In terms of the basic goals it establishes, the new BEP offers considerable continuity with 
previous statements of Japanese energy policy.  It maintains the traditional goals, the so-called “3 
E’s”: energy security, environmental sustainability, and economic efficiency.  In addition, it 
reiterates two other goals that have been associated with Japan’s controversial nuclear power 
program: safety and public understanding. 
In several other important respects, however, the BEP represents a departure from past 
policy.  It includes for the first time two other goals.  One is the use of energy policy to promote 
more general economic growth.  The other is the need to restructure the energy industry.  In 
addition, the BEP places much more emphasis on fighting climate change than did the NNES, 
which was primarily concerned with energy security.  Indeed, if one is to judge the BEP by the 
summary published on the METI website, one might easily reach the conclusion that the most 
important objective of Japanese policy is to reduce energy-related carbon emissions.  It is likely 
that this apparent obsession is in response to former prime minister Hatoyama’s 2009 pledge to 
reduce Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions substantially by 2020. 
 The BEP also offers significant changes in the key targets of Japanese energy policy.  Like 
the BEP, the 2006 NNES had established five specific, numerical targets (METI 2006a, 14): 
o a further 30 percent improvement in energy efficiency (over 2003); 
o a reduction in Japan’s oil dependence from nearly 50 percent to less than 40 percent of the 
total energy mix; 
o a reduction in the oil dependence of the transportation sector from nearly 100 percent to 
around 80 percent; 
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o a preservation or increase in nuclear power’s share of electricity generation to 30 to 40 
percent or more; and 
o an increase in the amount of oil produced by Japanese energy companies from 15 percent to 
around 40 percent of total oil consumption. 
 One can readily detect a number of differences between the NNES and the BEP in this 
regard, however.  One is a shift in emphasis from improving energy efficiency, which was the first 
target of the NNES, to reducing energy-related carbon emissions.  Obviously, these two goals are 
related, but they are not identical.  Related to this change is increased emphasis on the residential 
sector, reflecting the fact that CO2 emissions in the residential and commercial sectors have grown 
by nearly 50 percent since 1990 while those from transportation and industry have declined over 
the past decade. 
A second difference is a shift in the conceptualization of energy security and independence.  
The NNES was focused primarily on oil, which figured in three of the five targets.  In contrast, the 
2010 BEP employs broader measures: an overall measure of energy-self sufficiency and a 
comprehensive measure of the share of all fossil fuels that are supplied by Japanese companies.  It 
also offers a new measure of overall energy independence that combines the two other ratios. 
 Third, the BEP contains much more ambitious and detailed targets for nuclear power.  The 
new target represents an increase in the share of nuclear generated electricity of at least 10-20 
percent over that contained in the NNES.  In addition, and in contrast to the NNES and its 
associated “Nuclear Energy National Plan” (METI 2006b), the BEP contains very specific figures 
for the number of new nuclear power plants to be built and the level of capacity utilization to be 
attained. 
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 Fourth, the BEP likewise contains more ambitious and detailed targets for renewable 
sources of energy.  In fact, the NNES contained no specific targets for renewable energy.  Because 
of growing concerns about climate change, the government had subsequently (by 2009) established 
a goal of increasing the share of renewable energy in the primary energy supply from six percent 
(2005) to 9.0 percent in 2020 and 11.6 percent in 2030.17  But the BEP raises these targets even 
higher, to 13 percent.  According to one government estimate, a comprehensive feed-in tariff could 
increase electricity production from new sources by 40 to 50 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) or more 
(roughly four to five percent of Japan’s current output) in 10 years.18  But as of early 2011, the 
comprehensive feed-in tariff had not yet been introduced (IEEJ 2011), and presumably additional 
measures would still be required if the targets contained in the BEP are to be achieved. 
 Finally, the BEP contains a completely new type of target - concerning the global market 
shares of Japanese energy companies - that reflects the new emphasis on economic growth and 
industry restructuring contained in the plan. 
 
4.2. Appropriateness: Are These the Right Goals and Targets? 
 One question that can be immediately raised about some of the goals and targets contained 
in the BEP concerns their suitability.  Two in particular merit scrutiny.  One is the 
reconceptualization of energy security and independence.  In particular, the introduction of the 
concept of the self-developed fossil fuel supply may obscure important differences in the markets 
for oil, natural gas, and coal and Japan’s corresponding vulnerabilities.  Until now, Japan’s 
principal concern has been with access to oil, and the government has been trying to raise the level 
of so-called “equity oil” (oil produced by Japanese companies) since the 1970s, although without 
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much success.  In 2003, the percentage of oil imports provided by Japanese companies stood at 
10.8 percent, just one percentage point higher than the corresponding figure for 1970 (Koike et al. 
2008, 1767). 
The new measure suggests, intentionally or not, that coal, natural gas, and oil are ready 
substitutes.  This may be true to an important extent in the generation of electric power, where the 
share accounted for by oil has dropped from around 75 percent in 1973 to about 12 percent in 2007 
(EDMC 2010, 188).  But it is less true of industry, where the share of energy provided by oil 
declined from 61 to 43 percent over the same period (EDMC 2010, 66).  And it is not at all true of 
transportation, which remained entirely dependent on oil in 2007.  Not only that, but industry and 
transportation together account for more than 80 percent of oil consumption, not including the 
relatively small amount used to generate electricity (EDMC 2010, 166).   
Traditionally, moreover, Japan has worried most about the security of its foreign oil 
supplies.  To be sure, its imports of natural gas have not been immune to disruption; in 2001, an 
important LNG plant in Indonesia, which provided about 30 percent of Japan’s LNG imports at the 
time, was closed for seven months because of political unrest (IEA 2002, 78).  But nearly 90 
percent of Japan’s oil comes from the Middle East and must pass through vulnerable choke points 
(EMDC 2010, 154; interview with METI officials, Tokyo, May 26, 2010).  Japan’s particular 
vulnerability to disruptions in foreign oil supplies will be less of an issue as its overall oil 
consumption and the oil dependence of the transportation sector decline, but it will not go away 
completely. 
 Another issue concerns the focus on improving energy efficiency in the industrial sector.  
There may be significant efficiency gains to be made, but the industrial sector may not be the best 
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place to look for them.  To be sure, industry remains the largest energy consumer, at 46 percent in 
2008 (EDMC 2010, 38).  But it has also been the principal target of government efforts to increase 
energy efficiency since the 1970s -- approximately 90 percent of the energy consumption in the 
sector has long been covered by the Energy Conservation Law  and, partly as a result, the share of 
energy consumption attributable to the industrial sector has steadily declined, from nearly 
two-thirds in 1973 (EMDC 2010, 38; ECCJ 2009, 3).19  Thus most of the easy savings in industry 
have already been exploited (see also Niquet 2007, 8). 
 
4.3. Feasibility 
 The other question that might be raised concerns the feasibility of the new BEP. What are 
the prospects for achieving the ambitious targets it sets forth?  This question is necessarily more 
difficult to answer with any certainty.  Much can change over the next 20 years, and the BEP is 
likely to be revised multiple times accordingly.  In addition, the achievement of several of the 
targets will be sensitive to progress in attaining other targets. At a minimum, however, one can say 
that attainment of the targets is likely to be challenging, especially given the deep-seated doubts 
concerning the future of Japan’s reliance on nuclear power brought to the fore by the March 2011 
earthquake and tsunami that severely damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and 
released radioactive elements into the environment. 
Let us start with the issue of achieving a much higher level of energy independence, as 
defined by the “energy independence ratio.”  Much will depend on how rapidly Japan is able to 
raise the production of electricity (and heat) from renewable sources and nuclear power and reduce 
the overall level of energy consumption.  The lower the level of energy consumption and the higher 
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the level of domestic energy production, the less fossil fuel Japan will have to import and the easier 
it will be to raise the self-developed fossil fuel supply (SFFS) ratio. 
According to the figures supplied by METI, Japan consumed 497 mkL of oil equivalent in 
fossil fuels in 2007, while Japanese companies produced the equivalent of 26 percent of that 
amount, or 129 mkL of oil equivalent.  METI projects that Japanese fossil fuel consumption will 
decline to 325 mkL in 2030.  In that case, Japanese companies would have to produce 162 mkL to 
achieve the target of a 50 percent SFFS ratio, or an increase of just 33 mkL (25 percent) over the 
2007 level.  That may be a feasible figure, although, as noted above, Japanese oil companies have 
not been very successful in increasing the amount of oil they produce over the years.  And, needless 
to say, if the reduction in fossil fuel consumption falls short of that projection, the challenge for 
Japanese companies will be that much greater. 
A second issue concerns the feasibility of substantially reducing energy-related CO2 
emissions.  There certainly would seem to be considerable potential for doing so, especially in the 
residential and commercial sectors, which have seen significant increases in emissions since 1990 
despite the overall stagnation of the Japanese economy.  But the achievement of this goal, too, will 
depend on how quickly ever greater levels of renewable and nuclear energy can be introduced 
(more on this below).  And the recent history of independent efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions affords few grounds for optimism.  The new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led 
government made fighting climate change a high priority and soon after taking office in the fall of 
2009 announced an ambitious goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 25 percent by 2020.  
The legislation that it introduced the following March on “global warming countermeasures,” 
however, faced strong opposition from the business community and remained unfinished in July 
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2010, when the DPJ suffered losses in the upper house elections, putting the ultimate fate of the 
legislation in doubt (IEEJ 2010b, 8).20 
Closely related is the goal of making improvements in energy efficiency, especially in the 
industrial sector.  Here the difficulty lies in the fact that Japan’s overall energy efficiency, as 
defined by the ratio of primary energy consumption (PEC) over GDP, is already the world’s 
lowest, and is even significantly lower – by approximately 50 percent -- than that of the EU or the 
United States (Masaki 2006).21  Yet most of the drop in Japan’s energy intensity occurred by the 
mid-1980s.  In fact, between 1990 and 2005, it declined by less than three percent (EDMC 2010, 
32). Thus it appears that many of the easiest gains have already been made, and the particular 
challenges of increasing energy efficiency in the industrial sector have been noted above.   
 Turning now to the supply side, the central issue, which has been raised already, is the 
potential to expand the amount of energy provided by renewable sources and nuclear power.  On 
the positive side, the amount of renewables has grown rapidly over the past decade.  Between 1998 
and 2008, installed generating capacity of wind and solar grew from 170 megawatts (MW) to 4.0 
GW (EMDC 2010, 207).  In late 2009, the government established a buy back program for surplus 
electricity generated by PV installed at residences and other entities, with a target of increasing the 
amount of installed PV capacity more than 20-fold (from 2.1 GW in 2008 to 28 GW) by 2020.22  
According to one government estimate, moreover, a comprehensive feed-in tariff covering all 
small sources could increase electricity production from new sources by 40 to 50 billion kWh or 
more (roughly four to five percent of Japan’s current output) in 10 years, or approximately half of 
the increase desired by 2030.23 
On the other hand, the challenges that would be posed by widespread reliance on new 
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sources still must be overcome.  Because Japan’s hydroelectric potential is already largely 
exploited, virtually all of the additional renewable generating capacity called for in the BEP, some 
67 GW, would have to come from other sources.  And concerns remain about the ability of the 
electricity grid to handle more than a certain amount of electricity from intermittent sources, such 
as solar and wind (interview with non-governmental experts, Tokyo, June 4, 2010).  For example, 
the existing power system could accommodate enough photovoltaic generating capacity to provide 
only about six to eight percent of the electricity supply (interview with academic expert, Tokyo, 
May 31, 2010; interview with non-governmental experts, Tokyo, June 4, 2010).  Thus greater 
penetration by renewables may depend on the development of cost-effective, large-scale electric 
storage capacity (interview with METI official Tokyo, May 27, 2010).  In addition, the most 
productive sites for wind power tend to be located far from where the electricity is needed, 
necessitating the construction of new power lines often in the face of local resistance (interview 
with academic expert, Tokyo, May 31, 2010).  Finally, given the intermittent nature of many 
renewables, the amount of capacity that must be built to produce every kWh of electricity will be 
several times greater than for other sources, greatly reducing their cost-effectiveness.24  Thus, 
according to one estimate, even 100 GW of installed photovoltaic capacity, or the equivalent of 
nearly 40 percent of the current power generating capacity, would meet just 12 percent of Japan’s 
electricity demand (interview with academic expert, Tokyo, May 31, 2010). And a recent METI 
electricity supply plan projects that total power generation by hydroelectric and “new-energy” 
plants in 2019 will be just 29 percent higher than the 2007 level, well short of the 142 percent 
increase called for in the BEP.25  
 A different set of problems is likely to limit the potential for the introduction of biofuels, 
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even at the modest target of three percent of the gasoline supply.  In recent years, concern about the 
environmental sustainability of biofuels production has grown (e.g., EPA 2009).  If the goal is to 
reduce CO2 emissions by 50 percent in comparison with gasoline, then that leaves few potential 
sources of supply, given current technologies.  According to one government estimate, the 
domestic supply of biofuels could be increased to only 400,000 kiloliter crude oil equivalent (COE, 
or about 0.343 MTOE) (IEEJ 2010a, 7), which would amount to less than 0.5 percent of current 
domestic demand.  At the same time, the potential for expanding environmentally sustainable 
imports from Brazil, the world’s largest biofuels exporter, is limited to about 200,000 kiloliter 
COE (about 0.172 MTOE) (IEEJ 2010a, 7). 
For all these reasons, METI predicted in 2009 that the share of the primary energy supply 
provided by renewables in 2030 would reach only 11.6 percent, less than the 13 percent called for 
in the BEP, even with “maximum introduction of technology.”26  And as challenging as achieving 
the targets for renewable energy may be, even more controversy is likely to attend the targets for 
nuclear power.  Here, two distinct issues are involved: increasing the amount of electricity 
generating capacity, chiefly by building more power plants, and raising the capacity utilization 
(utility factor) of the nuclear power plants.  In both cases, at least the short- to medium-term 
outlook is not encouraging.  Indeed, one nuclear industry expert admitted in an interview, “no one 
thinks they will be achievable” (interview with non-governmental experts, Tokyo, May 25, 2010]. 
As noted above, the BEP calls for the construction of at least 14 more nuclear reactors by 
2030, with a combined capacity of 18 GW, assuming none of the 54 existing reactors is 
decommissioned in the meantime.  The construction of new reactors has slowed greatly in the last 
decade, however, because of safety concerns and local opposition, and the crisis caused by the 
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March 2011 earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, which will 
result in the loss of at least four reactors with a combined generating capacity of 2.8 GW,  is likely 
to greatly compound those concerns.  A major reason behind the waning enthusiasm for new 
nuclear power plant construction derives from the anxieties generated by a series of mishaps (IEA 
2003, 105-106).  Until the crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, the most notorious of these were a 
1981 incident in which nearly 300 workers were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation after a 
fuel rod ruptured at the Tsuruga nuclear power plant and the death of five workers in 2004 as a 
result of a steam explosion at the Mihama-3 station.  A subsequent investigation into the causes of 
the Mihama incident revealed serious deficiencies in the inspection procedures for nuclear 
facilities that led to a through reconsideration of policy (Buckley 2006).  The anxiety generated by 
these mishaps is magnified by the citizenry’s “nuclear allergy” as a result of the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Berger 1998), and the fact that earthquakes frequently rattle the Japanese 
archipelago.  Actual and potential public opposition to new nuclear power plants, which could 
result in long delays in the licensing process, has in turn made the utilities reluctant to invest 
heavily in them, given the high costs of construction (interview with non-governmental experts, 
Tokyo, May 25, 2010; interview with academic expert, Tokyo, May 31, 2010). The 2006 NNES 
effectively called for an increase in the number of nuclear facilities, yet as of early 2010, only one 
reactor had been completed since the NNES was issued, and all of the reactors planned in 2006 
were as many as three to five years further behind schedule.27  Thus, the Japan Atomic Energy 
Commission concluded in 2009, “No considerable growth is expected for the present regarding 
activities to construct new or additional plants in Japan” (JAEC 2009, 21). 
 Increasing capacity utilization is not likely to be much easier.  From the mid-1990s to the 
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early 2000s, nuclear capacity utilization in Japan hovered around 80 percent, and during the past 
five years, it has been consistently below 70 percent and fallen as low as 58 percent.  In contrast, 
the nuclear utility factor in the United States, South Korea, and Finland has fluctuated between 90 
and 95 percent in recent years (Nagatomi et al. 2010).  The reasons for the relatively low utility 
factor in Japan include shorter operational cycles between routine inspections and maintenance, 
longer outage times for maintenance and repairs, and extensive unplanned outages due to 
accidents, including a 2007 earthquake that shut down seven reactors, and other safety concerns 
(interview with non-governmental experts, Tokyo, IEEJ, May 25, 2010 ).  The higher utility factors 
in other countries suggest there is considerable potential for raising Japan’s by following similar 
practices.  But the potential for earthquakes affecting nuclear sites remains relatively high in Japan, 
as illustrated most dramatically by the March 2011 temblor and tsunami that caused the reactor 
cooling systems to malfunction at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, and local 
governments continue to have a say in the length of the operational cycle as well as when plants can 
resume operation after planned and, especially, unplanned outages (interview with 
non-governmental experts, Tokyo, May 25, 2010; interview with academic expert, Tokyo, May 31, 
2010). 
Finally, we must consider the general level of support likely to be had by the BEP.  To be 
implemented, it will require the cooperation of industry and the general public.  Here, too, 
however, there are grounds for concern, which were raised in the discussions of the METI energy 
advisory committee prior to the BEP’s adoption.   At least one member expressed the view that 
since the government is planning to tighten regulations to a substantial extent, it is questionable 
whether industry would agree to go along with the plan (IEEJ 2010b, 7).  And another committee 
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member reportedly commented that consumers may not be able to afford many of the innovations 
required to achieve the targets of the plan, such as zero-emission houses, high efficiency water 
heaters, and next-generation automobiles (IEEJ 2010a, 4). 
Such reservations, especially those of industry, are likely to carry considerable weight.  
Traditionally, energy policy has been the purview of METI, which has close ties to the business 
community.  Among METI’s chief private-sector allies are the ten regional utility monopolies (e.g., 
Tokyo Electric Power Company and Nippon Keidanren, the umbrella organization for major 
corporations and nation-wide industrial federations.  It is common for METI bureaucrats – as well 
as other government officials – to retire from the government service and “descend from heaven” 
(amakudari) into “second careers” with private- or quasi-governmental companies.  Policy 
proposals typically originate in “deliberative councils” (shingikai) organized under a particular 
ministry with members drawn from the private sector, think tanks, academia, and the mass media.  
Not surprisingly, it is rare that a council proposes policies that are not supported by the parent 
ministry. 
In more recent years, METI has had to compete within the bureaucracy with the Ministry of 
Environment (MOE) to shape government policy and strategy (Lam 2009), but the playing field 
remains tilted in METI’s favor.  Although the MOE’s position has been backed the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which enjoys championing the Kyoto Protocol and other global causes, as well as 
environmental groups such as Eco-Japan, METI is universally regarded as one of the country’s 
elite economic ministries (Johnson 1982), while the MOE did not achieve full ministerial status 
until 2001.  Also, the deep-pocketed regional utility monopolies and industrial energy users have 
cultivated salubrious ties with influential politicians through generous campaign contributions that 
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far outpace the resources available to environmental groups.    
 
5. Conclusion 
Japan is to be commended for having such a systematic and comprehensive energy 
planning process.  None of the other major advanced industrialized countries produces a 
comprehensive national energy plan on such a regular basis.  The Japanese government is also to 
be commended for taking the issues of energy security and climate change so seriously.  And 
government leaders such as former prime minister Hatoyama are to be commended for having the 
courage to pledge significant cuts in energy-related carbon emissions. 
Nevertheless, the 2010 BEP, like the NNES before it, is a highly ambitious document.  It 
sets very challenging targets for 2030.  Being ambitious is not in and of itself to be faulted, but it 
does raise the potential for provoking negative reactions by affected parties and, ultimately, a 
disappointing gap between its aspirations and achievements.  For example, a number of 
knowledgeable insiders believe that Hatoyama’s pledge to cut energy-related carbon emissions by 
25 percent by 2020 is unattainable.28  Indeed, at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 
held in Cancún in late 2010, the Japanese government reversed its stance and indicated its 
opposition to extending the Kyoto protocol.  The likely impetus for this policy flip-flop was the 
desire to avoid disadvantaging Japan vis-à-vis countries such as China and India that are not bound 
to make similar carbon emissions cuts (Vidal 2010). 
 Compounding the inherent difficulty of achieving the targets set by the BEP is the fact that 
the Japanese political scene remains highly unsettled.  Japan has had five prime ministers since the 
announcement of the 2006 Basic Energy Plan.  It also saw the most decisive shift in electoral 
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fortunes in decades in 2009, when the DPJ unseated the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP).  But the DPJ itself lost its hold on one of the two houses of the Diet as a result of the July 
2010 elections.  With a “twisted parliament,” in which the DPJ controls the Diet’s lower house but 
not its upper house, it is likely that Japan will face a prolonged period of political gridlock.  And 
there is the additional problem of the DPJ’s lack of policymaking expertise as a result of the many 
years it spent in opposition while the LDP wielded a virtual monopoly on parliamentary power.  
The economic setting is no more auspicious.  For the past two decades, after the collapse of 
the Japanese bubble economy, real GDP per capita has grown at a rate of less than one percent per 
year.  Given the current depressed state of the world economy, a rapid economic recovery is not 
likely to be in the cards.  It is important to recall that it was the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 that 
brought down the curtain on Japan’s postwar economic boom, which was characterized by 
double-digit annual rates of growth.  In response, the government enacted energy conservation 
measures which are among the most stringent in the industrialized world, leading some to dub 
Japan a “superpower” in energy efficiency (Stewart and Wilczewski 2009).  Thus the resources 
needed to pay for significant changes in the energy supply and demand structures as well as energy 
industry are likely to be hard to come by.  And, at the very least, the massive damage inflicted by 
March 2011 earthquake and tsunami will prompt soul-searching about the future of nuclear power 
as a component of Japan’s overall energy policy.   
Nevertheless, 20 years is a long time in policy circles.  Much could happen between now 
and 2030, the target year for the achievement of the goals contained in the BEP.  Thus it is far too 
soon to pronounce the new BEP unachievable. 
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Notes 
1 An excellent analysis of the NNES is Peter 2006. 
2 Interview with Keiji Kanda (Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University and Director of the Energy 
Policy Research Institute) published on the website of METI’s Hokkaido Economy and Industry 
Bureau at http://www.hkd.meti.go.jp/hokpp/humanenergy/070304/about.htm. 
3 The Diet (kokkai – literally, “national assembly”) is composed of a House of Representative and a 
House of Councillors.  Members of both houses are popularly elected.  The Diet gets its name from 
the nineteenth century Prussian body after which it was partially modeled, although its 1947 
reconfiguration was inspired by Britain’s parliamentary system.  According to the Constitution of 
Japan, the Diet is “the highest organ of state power” and “the sole law-making organ of the State” 
(Article 41). 
4 In a published interview, Kano observed that his background as an executive of an electric power 
company sensitized him to the absence of a meaningful energy policy in the ruling LDP’s platform.  
After gaining election to the upper house in 1998, Kano made a strong effort to realize a “debate on 
energy policy within the Diet for the citizenry to behold” (Kano 2002, 68). 
5 METI is the direct organizational descendent of “notorious MITI” (Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry), which was the cockpit of policy for strategic industries during Japan’s 
high-speed growth era (mid-1950s through the end of the 1970s).  In contrast, the MOE’s 
organizational predecessor was the Environment Agency, which operated under the Prime 
Minister’s Office. 
6 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2007/05/24speech_e.html (accessed Oct. 27, 2010). 
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7 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/ondanka/final080729.pdf (accessed Oct. 27, 2010). 
8 http://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/cc/bagwc/overview_bill.pdf (accessed Oct. 27, 2010). 
9“Annual Solar Photovoltaics Production by Country, 1995-2009,” Earth Policy Institute Data 
Center, available at http://www.earth-policy.org/index.php?/data_center/C23/ (accessed Oct. 1, 
2010). 
10 Margaret Coker, “Korean Team to Build U.A.E. Nuclear Plants,” Wall Street Journal, 28 Dec. 
2009, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB100014240527487049057045746216530029923
02.html (accessed Oct. 27, 2010). 
11 The 2010 plan is sometimes referred to as the “Strategic Energy Plan.” 
12 http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/data/20100326_03.html (accessed Oct. 27, 2010). 
13 The plan is available at http://http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/kihonkeikaku/index.htm 
(accessed August 3, 2010). Except where otherwise noted, the following description of the plan is 
based on the authors’ translation of the plan and  METI, “The Strategic Energy Plan of Japan: 
Meeting Global Challenges and Securing Energy Futures (Revised in June 2010) [Summary]” 
(June 2010), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/data/pdf/20100618_08a.pdf 
(accessed August 3, 2010).  See also the accompanying press release at 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/data/20100618_08.html (accessed August 3, 2010). 
14 According to one source, the target of a 30 percent reduction by 2030 was added at the time of 
the cabinet approval of the BEP (IEEJ 2010b, 7).  It would be a logical extension of former prime 
minister Hatoyama’s pledge, famously made at the United Nations in September 2009, to cut 
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Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions by 25 percent from their 1990 levels by the year 2020.  See 
“Statement by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama at the United Nations Summit on Climate 
Change,” 22 Sept. 2009, available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/200909/ehat_0922_e.html (accessed Oct. 2, 
2010). 
15 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, “The Outline on Revision of Natural Resources and 
Energy Policy (Draft) (Toward Revision of Basic Plan for Energy) [Summary]” (April 2010). 
16 Specifically, the plan seeks to increase the operating cycle from the current 13 months maximum 
between inspections to 18 months or longer by 2030 (IEEJ 2010a, 6). 
17 “Policies on New & Renewable Energy in Japan,” unpublished document provided by METI 
officials, June 2010. 
18 “Potential scenarios about feed-in tariff scheme of renewable energy,” unpublished document 
provided by METI officials, June 2010. 
19 See also “Energy Efficiency Policies & Measures in Japan,” unpublished document provided by 
METI officials, June 2010.  For detailed descriptions of the extensive conservation measures that 
the government has taken in the industrial sector since the 1970s, see IEA 2008, 67-69, and ECCJ 
2009, 72-86. 
20 A summary of the bill is available at http://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/cc/bagwc/overview_bill.pdf 
(accessed August 5, 2010). 
21 “Energy Efficiency Policies & Measures in Japan.” 
22 “Policies on New & Renewable Energy in Japan.” 
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23 “Potential scenarios about feed-in tariff scheme of renewable energy.” 
24 Based on the figures provided by METI, the utilization capacity of renewables will be just 20 
percent. 
25 METI, “Outline of FY 2010 Electricity Supply Plan,” cited in Koji Morita, “The Current Status 
of LNG: Uncertainty from Japan,” 29 Sept. 2010, available at 
http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/3469.pdf (accessed March 11, 2011). 
26 “Policies on New & Renewable Energy in Japan.” 
27Based on a comparison of WNA 2010, 6, and METI 2006b, 26. 
28Interviews with Japanese policymakers, Tokyo, May-June, 2010. 
